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Abstract: Several recent debates in ethics and metaethics highlight what has been called the 
“central deliberative question.” For instance, in cases involving normative uncertainty, it is 
natural to ask questions like “I don’t know what I ought to do—now what ought I to do?” 
But it is not clear how this question should be understood, since what I ought to do is 
precisely what I do not know. Similar things can be said about questions raised by 
normative conflicts, so-called “alternative normative concepts,” and other similar 
problems. This paper defends a form of non-cognitivism about these questions that is 
combined with cognitivism about normative questions proper. A central claim is that we 
should distinguish the question of what we ought to do from the question of what to do, 
and that this distinction in turn has important consequences for our understanding of 
normative guidance, decision-making and deliberation. Two challenges to the non-
cognitivist view defended are met, and its relationship to realism and “quasi-realism” about 
normativity is considered. 
   
1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to present and defend an account of a distinctive form of “practical” or 
“deliberative” question that is central in several debates in ethics, metaethics, and 
metanormativity more generally. Most writers assume that this question concerns some special 
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normative issue, such as what we ought to do “all things considered.”1 I will argue against this 
assumption and instead endorse an alternative view, which combines elements of both 
metaethical cognitivism and non-cognitivism. A notable consequence of this view is that even if 
there are truths about how we (all things considered) ought to act—truths which may even be 
objective, irreducible, and so on—the “central deliberative question,” as it is has sometimes been 
called, does not concern those truths.2 Instead, that question does not have a true answer. 
One debate that highlights the relevant kind of question is the one about normative 
uncertainty.3 Since we are not epistemically flawless beings, it seems that we are often (or at least 
sometimes) not in a position to know what we ought to do. As many have noted, such situations 
make it natural to ask questions like: “I don’t know what I ought to do—now what ought I to do?” 
For obvious reasons, however, it is unclear how this question should be understood. After all, 
what the agent ought to do is precisely what she does not know! 
Another example concerns choices in the face of conflicting normative requirements.4 If 
we must choose between promoting the common good and promoting our own good, for 
instance, the requirements of morality might clash with those of prudence in such a way that we 
cannot satisfy both. Such situations invite other questions that are difficult to understand, such 
as: “Which ought—the moral or the prudential one—ought I really to satisfy?” Here too it is 
unclear how to understand the question that is raised, since after all, it is really the case that we 
 
1 Similarly to Mark Schroeder and others, I will generally use the term “normative” to mean, roughly, 
“having to do with value, oughts, reasons, duties, and the like” (Schroeder, “Realism and Reduction: The 
Quest for Robustness”, 3), though see section 10 for a discussion of other things that can be meant by 
“normative.”  
2 For this expression, see, e.g., Lord, “What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do 
(Are the Same Thing!),” 1110, and McPherson, “Explaining Practical Normativity,” 621. 
3 See, e.g., MacAskill, Bykvist and Ord, Moral Uncertainty, Sepielli, “What to Do when You Don’t Know 
What to Do,” and Weatherson, Normative Externalism. 
4 See, e.g., Chang, “‘All Things Considered’”, and Baker, “Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.” 
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ought morally to satisfy the requirements of morality, and that we ought prudentially to satisfy 
the requirements of prudence. 
I will argue that the salient question in these and other choice situations does not strictly 
speaking concern what we ought to do, in any sense of “ought.” Nor does it concern any other 
normative question. The reason, as I will argue, is that this question may well remain unanswered 
even in choice situations where all the truths, including all the normative truths, are known. The 
best explanation of this fact, I suggest, is that while uncertainty about normative questions 
amounts to uncertainty about the truth of some normative proposition—concerning, e.g., what 
one ought to do—the “central deliberative question” is instead the question of what to do. I 
further suggest that we understand the question of what to do along the lines suggested by Allan 
Gibbard.5 On this view, roughly, one does not answer this question by forming a belief about 
what the world is like (not even in normative respects), but by forming an intention to act in a 
certain way. We should thus adopt cognitivism about normative questions but non-cognitivism 
about the question that sometimes seems to remain even when all normative questions are 
answered. A similar non-cognitivist view has recently been defended by Justin Clarke-Doane in 
response to one of the problems that I will discuss, concerning what Matti Eklund calls alternative 
normative concepts, and one contribution of the paper is to argue that this form of non-cognitivism 
is also plausible with respect to several other problems in ethics, metaethics and 
metanormativity.6 
After briefly introducing the problem of alternative normative concepts and the non-
cognitivist view about the question that it raises (sect. 2), I will show how similar questions are 
also raised by an argument against objective consequentialism due to Frank Jackson (sect. 3–4), 
 
5 Gibbard, Thinking How to Live. 
6 Clarke-Doane, Morality and Mathematics; Eklund, Choosing Normative Concepts; see also Balaguer, “Moral 
Folkism and the Deflation of (Lots of) Normative and Metaethics.” 
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in the normative uncertainty debate (sect. 5–6), and by normative conflicts and what Christine 
Korsgaard calls the “normative question” (sect. 7).7 Along the way, I will consider a number of 
alternative accounts of how this question should be understood, and argue that they all face 
important challenges. My final argument to that effect focuses on the possibility that the 
normative truths are dramatically different from what we take them to be (sect. 8). I then return 
to the question of how the relevant form of non-cognitivism is best understood, explain how my 
preferred version of it differs from “quasi-realism” about normative judgments (sect. 9) and 
consider two challenges to it (sect. 10). Section 11 concludes. 
 
2. Alternative normative concepts 
The problem of alternative normative concepts can be introduced by noting that for the most part, 
historical contingencies are least partially responsible for what concepts we happen to employ—
and, more generally, for how we happen to think. If evolutionary processes had shaped our 
cognition differently, for example, we might well have represented the world using concepts that 
we do not in fact have. This raises the question: could the same be true of our normative concepts, 
such as OUGHT, GOOD, and REASON?8 That is, are there alternative normative concepts, which could 
play the same role in our lives as our actual normative concepts do, but which are true of different 
actions, attitudes, and so on? If so, is there any suitably neutral way to ask which set of normative 
concepts we ought to use? 
Eklund makes the problem vivid by imagining a community of speakers, “Alternative,” 
who use the concept OUGHT* in much the same way that we use the concept OUGHT. That is, while 
we perform actions that we judge that we ought to perform, they perform actions that they judge 
 
7 Jackson, “Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection”; Korsgaard, The 
Sources of Normativity. 
8 I use small caps to denote concepts. 
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that they ought* to perform; whereas we criticize and resent people who do things that we believe 
ought not to be done, they criticize and resent people who do things that they believe ought* not 
to be done; and so on. But in the imagined case, OUGHT and OUGHT* are not coextensive—there 
are some actions that ought but ought* not to be done (or vice versa). If this case is possible, then, 
as Eklund notes, 
 
[a] first thought one might have is that […] there is some sort of live issue as to whether 
we or the alternative community get things right. They do what they do based on 
considerations about what is “good” and “right” in their sense; we do what we do based 
on considerations about what is “good” and “right” in our sense. Since our normative 
terms and their normative counterparts aren’t coextensive, we then act differently… [But] 
what set of normative terms ought to be used when we ask ourselves what to do?9 
 
In other words, if we learn that there are alternatives to the normative concepts that we actually 
have, we might want to ask questions like: What ought we to do? Should we “go with” what we 
ought to do or what we ought* to do? Which set of normative concepts and/or terms ought we 
use? However, as Eklund goes on to note, it is not plausible that the salient further question 
literally concerns what normative concepts we ought to use (or any other issue that can 
straightforwardly be put in terms of our actual normative concepts). The reason is that this 
question might have an answer that is too easy: perhaps we simply ought to use OUGHT—and 
perhaps we equally ought* to use OUGHT*! Similarly, perhaps we should go with what we should 
to do, but should* go with what we should* do—and so on. 
 
9 Eklund, Choosing Normative Concepts, 22. 
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Several other views about the salient further question are possible. One is that the case is 
impossible as described (and so the question does not even arise), because all concepts that have 
the same “normative role” with respect to guiding behavior are also coextensive.10 Another view 
is that the question is in some sense “ineffable”—it is genuine but cannot be perspicuously 
expressed in our language, and perhaps not in any possible language either.11 A third view is that 
although the case is possible, there is no genuine further question at all—there is only what we 
ought to do and what we ought* to do and that is that. I mention these views only to set them 
aside. Instead, as already mentioned, the view that I will ultimately go on to endorse is a kind of 
non-cognitivism about this question. Drawing on Gibbard, Clarke-Doane proposes that the 
salient further question is best understood as a question of what to do; e.g., whether to do what 
we ought or what we ought* to do, or whether to use OUGHT or OUGHT* in deliberation, etc.12 This 
question is meant to be non-cognitive in the sense that one does not “answer” or “settle” it by 
forming a belief about some matter of fact (or by forming some other kind of doxastic attitude). 
Instead, one answers it by forming a non-cognitive attitude of some kind. On Gibbard’s view, it 
is a kind of intention. 
What is the relation between the question of what to do and the question of what we ought 
to do? According to Gibbard’s non-cognitivism (as it is usually understood), they are simply 
identical, given that his analysis is supposed to be true of the normative concepts that we in fact 
have.13 But other views may also be had. In particular, the view that I will go on to endorse is that 
 
10 This might follow from certain forms of “conceptual role semantics”; see, e.g., Wedgwood, “Conceptual 
Role Semantics for Moral Terms.” See also Fitzpatrick, “Commentary on Matti Eklund, Choosing Normative 
Concepts” for a suggestion along these lines. The expression “normative role” is from Eklund (e.g. Eklund, 
Choosing Normative Concepts, 10). 
11 For discussion of this view, see Eklund, Choosing Normative Concepts, ch. 2.2, and Clarke-Doane, Morality 
and Mathematics, 172. 
12 See Gibbard, Thinking How to Live, and Clarke-Doane, Morality and Mathematics, ch. 6. 
13 There are some interpretative complications, however; for instance, Gibbard at one point suggests that 
any analysis is likely to “strain” the concept that is analyzed, and proposes only that his view strains our 
actual normative concepts less than competing views (Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, 32). 
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the questions are different, in that the question of what we ought to do is a “question of fact” 
while the question of what to do is not. Thus, the question that I earlier called the “central 
deliberative question,” and which I take Eklund’s imagined scenario to highlight, is on this view 
understood as a non-factual question, rather than a factual, normative one. This view, I will argue, 
best explains why similarly puzzling kinds of questions—or, as I will often put it, similarly 
puzzling kinds of uncertainty—are raised by several other problems in ethics, metaethics, and 
metanormativity. One promising explanation of this commonality is that all these questions (and 
the corresponding forms of uncertainty) are of the same kind, and that some kind of non-
cognitivism is thus true in all these cases. Reflection on these other cases accordingly provides 
independent support for the relevant form of non-cognitivism. 
3. Objective Act-Consequentialism and Choices Under Empirical Uncertainty 
A quite different topic in ethics that brings the central deliberative question to the fore concerns 
a prominent worry about objective act-consequentialism, which is the view that we always ought 
to perform the action that would in fact have the best consequences.14 The worry is that in most 
or all real-life situations, it is impossible for us to know which action the view prescribes. This 
concern is also what motivates Jackson’s objection to the view, which departs from the following 
case: 
Jill is a physician who has to decide on the correct treatment for her patient, John, who has 
a minor but not trivial skin complaint. She has three drugs to choose from: drug A, drug B, 
and drug C. Careful consideration of the literature has led her to the following opinions. 
Drug A is very likely to relieve the condition but will not completely cure it. One of drugs 
 
14 When context does not indicate otherwise, I use “consequentialism” and “objective consequentialism” to 
refer to objective act-consequentialism. 
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B and C will completely cure the skin condition; the other though will kill the patient, and 
there is no way that she can tell which of the two is the perfect cure and which the killer 
drug.15 
 
The problem stems from the fact that according to objective consequentialism, Jill ought to give 
John the perfect cure, even though she does not know which drug that is. What Jill knows is only 
that it is either objectively best to give John drug B or to give him drug C. She can thus deduce 
that it is objectively suboptimal to give him drug A. But since Jill does not know whether drug B 
or drug C is the perfect cure, she does not know how to realize the best outcome. In view of this 
fact about her epistemic situation, Jackson writes that 
[the] problem arises from the fact that we are dealing with an ethical theory when we deal 
with consequentialism, a theory about action, about what to do. […] Now, the fact that an 
action has in fact the best consequences may be a matter which is obscure to an agent. 
(Similarly, it may be obscure to the agent what the objective chances are.) In the drugs 
example, Jill has some idea but not enough of an idea about which course of action would 
have the best results. […] Hence, the fact that a course of action would have the best results 
is not in itself a guide to action […]16 
 
When Jill is uncertain about what to do, the argument goes, learning that she ought to perform 
the objectively best action is useless since she does not know which action that is. Jackson thus 
 
15 Jackson, “Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection,” 462–463. See 
also Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-Operation, and Kolodny and MacFarlane, “Ifs and Oughts.” 
16 Jackson, “Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection,” 466–467. 
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concludes that consequentialism—which is a theory about what we ought to do—fails to answer 
the question of what to do for agents who do not know how to realize the best outcome.17 
It is extremely common that we do not know which of our alternative actions that are 
objectively best, however, and the point of the Jill and John case is not merely to emphasize that 
fact. Our ignorance about this is more easily illustrated by the fact that many of our actions have 
“massive causal ramifications.”18 In particular, seemingly mundane actions (like buying coffee) 
may affect what germ cells that will ever figure in conception, and thus, what people that will 
ever exist. As a result, their impact on the total amount of future well-being can be both dramatic 
and unknowable for us. Arguably, however, these considerations do not pose the same problem 
for objective consequentialism, since in such cases the view at least suggests an answer to the 
question of what to do: namely, to perform the action that is most likely to maximize objective 
value, or to try one’s best to do so, or something along those lines.19 By contrast, in the case of Jill 
and John, such courses of action seem clearly objectionable. Since Jill knows that drug A will not 
be best, the action that is most likely for her to maximize objective value is perhaps to flip a coin 
and give John either drug B or drug C, depending on the outcome. Yet it is surely a terrible idea 
to make the decision in this way. Instead, intuitively, Jill ought to give drug A to John, even 
though she knows that this does not maximize objective value. 
Jackson’s argument accordingly supports the view that we sometimes ought to perform 
actions that we know to be objectively suboptimal. If that view is true, then objective 
 
17 Note that while it is not clear what Jackson takes the expression “what to do” to mean, he probably does 
not accept the non-cognitivist interpretation of it that is associated with Gibbard, since he defends a form 
of cognitivism about normative concepts elsewhere (see Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics). 
18 This expression is from Lenman, “Consequentialism and Cluelessness,” 344. 
19 Jackson attributes a view along those lines to Peter Railton, though I note that it is unclear to me whether 
Railton in fact meant to endorse this view. See Jackson, “Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the 
Nearest and Dearest Objection,” 466, and Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of 
Morality.” 
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consequentialism is false, since objective consequentialism entails that all suboptimal actions are 
impermissible. Most of the literature on Jackson’s argument has thus focused on the question of 
whether giving John drug A really is what Jill ought to do.20 But in the current context, there is 
another aspect of Jackson’s argumentation that is more important. What ultimately underlies the 
argument is a widespread and natural view about the role of normative thinking in practical 
deliberation.21 It is illustrated by Jackson’s claim that unlike other areas of inquiry, ethics is 
centrally concerned with the “passage to action”: 
It is fine for a theory in physics to tell us about its central notions in a way which leaves it 
obscure how to move from those notions to action, for that passage can be left to something 
which is not physics; but the passage to action is the very business of ethics. 22 
 
In recent discussions about normativity, similar remarks have been frequent. For example, Jacob 
Ross writes that 
in genuine deliberation, we are guided, at least implicitly, by the question “what sould [sic] 
I do?” or “what ought I to do?” And we ask this question not simply in order to satisfy our 
curiosity, but in order to make up our minds about what to do, that is, in order to form an 
intention. Thus, the role of the ought of practical deliberation is to guide our intentions, and 
thereby to guide our actions.23 
 
 
20 See, e.g., Zimmerman, Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance. 
21 Of course, that is not to say that the view is universally accepted. For opposition, see, e.g., Parfit, On What 
Matters, Volume Two; and Zimmerman, Ignorance and Moral Obligation. See also Weatherson, Normative 
Externalism, who defends a view on which answers to normative questions need not be guiding. This view 
is congenial with my conclusion that the central deliberative question does not concern what we ought to 
do. 
22 Jackson, “Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection,” 467. 
23 Ross, “Rationality, Normativity, and Commitment,” 164. 
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In the same vein, Errol Lord claims that it is “commonly assumed that the answer to the central 
deliberative question is the thing that you ought to do, full stop,” David Faraci writes that 
“substantive normative claims answer (or at least entail that there is an answer to) the question 
of what to do,” and Jonathan Way and Daniel Whiting  suggest that “[i]n deliberation, we ask 
ourselves a single question, ‘What ought I to do?’”24 While the idea that all these claims suggest 
is perhaps somewhat imprecise, it is also highly intuitive. It is plausible that we normally do not 
engage in normative thinking with the sole aim of learning more about the world. We also do so 
in order to reach choices in our lives. And the worry that Jackson highlights is that objective 
consequentialism suggests that this aim is misguided. For while our lives are unavoidably full of 
uncertainty and ignorance about empirical facts, consequentialism entails that unless we have 
knowledge of those facts, we cannot figure out what we ought to do. Perhaps that result would 
not be so bad if we could instead settle for the action that is most likely to be best. But what 
Jackson’s argument suggests is that we sometimes ought not even to do that—rather, in some 
situations, we ought to perform actions which we know to be objectively suboptimal. And the 
worry is that in view of all this, it is hard to see how consequentialism can be reconciled with the 
role of normative thinking in practical deliberation that Jackson and Ross suggest. Even if 
objective consequentialism were true and we knew that this was so, our uncertainty about the 
 
24 See Lord, “What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!)”, 
1110, Faraci, “On Leaving Room for Doubt,” 248, and Way and Whiting, “Perspectivism and the Argument 
from Guidance,” 362. More generally along the same lines, Mark Timmons holds that normative ethics has 
both a “practical” and a “theoretical” aim, and Michael Smith claims that a metaethical theory must be able 
to accommodate both the “objectivity” and the “practicality” of moral judgments (see Timmons, Moral 
Theory: An Introduction, ch. 1, and M. Smith, The Moral Problem, ch. 1). For a recent discussion about using 
morality as a decision-guide under empirical uncertainty, see Holly Smith, Making Morality Work. Holly 
Smith does not focus on the issue of fundamental moral uncertainty (or of fundamental normative 
uncertainty more generally), however, which will be central in what follows. For an argument that Holly 
Smith’s idea that moral theories should be practically “usable” leads to a non-cognitivist view like the one 
that I endorse in this paper, see Clarke-Doane, “From Non-Usability to Non-Factualism.”  
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question of what to do would remain unresolved—and yet this is the very question, the thought 
goes, that consequentialism and other normative theories seek to answer. 
In what follows, I will summarize the above claims by saying that objective 
consequentialism fails to address the central deliberative question for agents who, like Jill, lack the 
relevant empirical knowledge. If Jackson’s and Ross’s idea is correct, the fact that 
consequentialism fails to do so is a serious problem for the view.  
4. Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism 
In view of the problems for objective consequentialism, Jackson instead endorses “decision-
theoretic consequentialism,” whose main motivation is its purported ability to avoid those 
problems. According to decision-theoretic consequentialism, every agent ought to maximize 
“expected moral utility,” where an action’s expected moral utility is determined (roughly) by 
summing the probability-weighed values of its possible outcomes.25 Notably, while the values in 
question are meant to be objective, Jackson takes the relevant probabilities to be the agent’s 
subjective ones. Thus, in one respect, the view resembles classical decision theory, as the agent’s 
own mental states partially determine what she ought to do, and in this respect it also differs 
from objective consequentialism.26 In another respect, however, Jackson’s view resembles 
objective consequentialism and differs from classical decision theory, as the agent’s preferences 
are not taken to determine the relevant ordering of an action’s possible outcomes—instead, that 
ordering is determined by the objective value facts, whatever they turn out to be. 
 
25 See Jackson, “Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection,” 464. 
26 Strictly speaking, classical decision theory states the conditions for representing an individual’s 
preferences with a particular representation function. Decision-theoretic consequentialism adopts the 
constraints of decision theory on preference orderings for use in a normative consequentialist theory. 
Thanks to Andrew Reisner for discussion. 
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Decision-theoretic consequentialism thus involves a combination of objective and 
subjective elements that is striking and seemingly unstable. Indeed, as a result, this view is 
susceptible to the very same problem that Jackson takes objective consequentialism to face: that 
it fails to address the central deliberative question for an agent to whom “the fact that an action 
has in fact the best consequences [is] obscure” (cf. sect. 2). For decision-theoretic consequentialism 
also centrally appeals to facts that are often “obscure” to us—namely, the objective value-facts 
about the possible outcomes of our actions.27 We are often uncertain about what is objectively 
good, and even when we are not, our views are often mistaken. In particular, the widespread 
disagreement about value illustrates this point: so many people have conflicting axiological views 
that at best, only a few of us can be correct.28  Hence, while Jackson is right that we often do not 
know what action maximizes objective value, he overlooks the fact that we often do not know 
what action maximizes expected moral utility either. 
One might think that the problem is less serious for decision-theoretic consequentialism 
if the relevant value facts can be known a priori, at least in principle. The problem with this 
suggestion is that the mere possibility of axiological knowledge makes no difference to an agent 
when she does not in fact have it. The case of Jill and John illustrates this point: while Jill does not 
know whether drug B or drug C is the perfect cure, it is perfectly possible for her to acquire such 
knowledge—all she has to do is to give John one of the risky drugs and observe the results. 
Clearly, however, the principled possibility of such knowledge is useless to her when she does 
not in fact have it. And the point is that the way in which she could acquire such knowledge is in 
 
27 For similar worries, see M. Smith, “Moore on the Right, the Good, and Uncertainty,” and Bykvist, “How 
to Do Wrong Knowingly and Get Away with It.” 
28 Moreover, on many plausible views about the epistemology of disagreement, a subject’s true axiological 
beliefs often or always fail to amount to knowledge when they are disputed (at least when the opponents 
are the subject’s epistemic “peers”); see further, e.g., McGrath, “Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise,” 
and Risberg and Tersman, “A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism,” “Disagreement, 
Defeat, and Higher-Order Evidence,” and “Moral Realism and the Argument from Skepticism.” 
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this regard irrelevant. Merely possible knowledge, whether a priori or otherwise, cannot help us 
in our decision-making. 
5. Choices Under Normative Uncertainty 
Decision-making under axiological uncertainty is a special case of decision-making under 
normative uncertainty more generally. We sometimes face hard choices, not because we are 
uncertain about the relevant empirical or axiological facts, but because we are uncertain about 
the fundamental normative facts. For example, many people must at some point decide whether 
to have children. When we try to figure out what we ought to do in such situations, we face 
difficult problems about our obligations toward future people, present people, merely possible 
people, and so on.29 Perhaps we sometimes solve those problems. Very often, however, we fail to 
do so. For instance, maybe it is just too hard for us to determine whether we are obliged to create 
a person with a good life rather than a person whose life would be worse, but nonetheless worth 
living, or no person at all. To answer that question, we must take a stance on the many 
controversial issues in population ethics. Due to their difficulty, some degree of uncertainty about 
their answers, or perhaps even suspension of judgment, seems to be warranted. Yet even 
somebody who is uncertain about those questions might one day have to decide whether to 
become a parent. She cannot wait until the true moral theory has been discovered, since she has 
to act now. Thus, she will have to deliberate about what to do, even though she has failed to 
determine what she ought to do. 
 
29 For two classic discussions of these problems, see Parfit, Reasons and Persons, part IV; and Arrhenius, 
Future Generations: A Challenge for Moral Theory. 
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The recent debate about choices under normative uncertainty has primarily been 
motivated by the aim of providing some sort of guidance in such situations.30 The hope is that 
even when we are uncertain about fundamental normative matters, there is a form of normative 
theorizing that can help us reach actions or decisions. While many different theories about these 
issues have been proposed, their details need not concern us here.31 I will instead focus on the 
question that theories about choices under normative uncertainty are supposed to answer. 
Participants to this debate often introduce their topic by noting, as I did above (cf. section 
1), that situations of normative uncertainty make it natural to ask questions like: “I can’t figure 
out what I ought to do; now what ought I to do?” However, they then usually note (as I also did 
above) that it is not clear how this question should be understood. After all, most traditional 
moral theories, like utilitarianism and Kantianism, entail that we ought to maximize happiness 
or to treat humanity as an end in itself (etc.) whether or not we believe this to be the case. Thus, 
on those views, what we ought to do is simply independent of our beliefs about the matter. This 
has led some to think that the question just posed has a trivial answer: we simply ought to do 
what the true normative theory entails that we ought to do, whether or not we know what that 
 
30 Michael Zimmerman’s work on this topic is an exception. See, e.g., Zimmerman, Living with Uncertainty: 
The Moral Significance of Ignorance. 
31 The currently most popular view is that normatively uncertain agents ought to maximize “expected 
choiceworthiness.” Unlike Jackson’s concept of expected moral utility, the concept of expected 
choiceworthiness is supposed to be sensitive both to the agent’s normative probabilities and her non-
normative probabilities. The viability of this strategy is the subject of an ongoing debate. One major concern 
is that it requires that “inter-theoretical” comparisons of choiceworthiness are meaningful. In other words, 
the degree to which an action is right according to utilitarianism must be comparable to the degree to which 
it is wrong according to Kantianism, for example, as its expected choiceworthiness is supposed to be the 
probability-weighed sum of those values. It is still unclear when, if ever, such comparisons are meaningful; 
in particular, as William MacAskill notes, the matter is especially complicated for agents who have some 
(justified) degree of belief in nihilism, on which the moral value of every action is not zero but undefined 
(see MacAskill, “The Infectiousness of Nihilism”). See for an overview of the debate and a discussion of 
how the strategy of maximizing expected choiceworthiness can be expanded to handle cases that involve 
incomparability, see MacAskill, Bykvist, and Ord, Moral Uncertainty. See also Harman, “The Irrelevance of 
Moral Uncertainty”, for an argument that moral uncertainty is not normatively important. 
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is. 32 On the one hand, this claim seems close to platitudinous and thus hard to deny. On the other 
hand, however, there is an obvious sense in which this answer fails to address the agent’s 
uncertainty in the situation just considered, just like objective consequentialism fails to address 
Jill’s uncertainty in the case of Jill and John. 
To avoid this result, the most popular strategy has been to hold that in the question “What 
ought I to do when I don’t know what I ought to do?”, the different occurrences of “ought” have 
different meanings. Following Andrew Sepielli, let us call this the dividers’ strategy.33 Dividers 
usually take the first occurrence of “ought” in this question to stand for the so-called “objective” 
ought. Traditional first-order theories like utilitarianism and Kantianism concern what we ought 
to do in this sense. The second occurrence of “ought,” by contrast, is supposed to stand for 
something that is not the concern of such theories. It is less clear what that ought is like, however, 
because dividers disagree about how many oughts there are. Some dividers stop at two—on that 
view, there is just an objective ought and a “subjective” ought and that is that.34 This has been a 
minority view, however, and many dividers instead posit a much larger number of oughts. In 
part, this is due to the fact that an important argument for the dividers’ view relies on the idea 
that seemingly incompatible “ought”-sentences can be jointly true relative to different states of 
information.35 Since there are clearly many different states of information, dividers are pushed 
towards positing many different oughts as well. For example, Andrew Sepielli writes that: 
 
32 See, e.g., Weatherson, “Review: Moral Uncertainty and Its Consequences,” and Normative Externalism. 
33 Sepielli, “Subjective and Objective Reasons.” Sepielli adopts this terminology to distinguish between 
“dividers” and “debaters” about the question of how we ought to act under uncertainty. For present 
purposes, we need not consider what semantics for “ought” that dividers should adopt. While it has 
sometimes been said that “ought” is genuinely ambiguous, like “bat” or “bank”, a more plausible view is 
that the lexical entry for “ought” has an informational parameter that is supplied by context. 
34 Harman, “The Irrelevance of Moral Uncertainty,” and Parfit, “What We Together Do,” both seem to 
endorse this view (though they also seem to endorse different theories about what we subjectively ought 
to do). 
35 For discussion of this idea, see Kolodny and MacFarlane, “Ifs and Oughts.” 
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[We] may speak of the belief-relative sense of “ought”, the reasonable-belief-relative sense, 
the degree-of-belief-relative (or credence-relative, or subjective-probability-relative) sense, 
the evidence-relative sense, and the objective-probability-relative sense, each of which 
depends for its proper application on the feature mentioned in its label. We could ramify 
even further. There are, for example, different “interpretations” of objective probability—
the long-run frequency interpretation, the propensity interpretation, the logical 
interpretation, etc.—and there could be an OUGHT corresponding to each interpretation. 
Finally, there is a subjective OUGHT that I call the minimal-probability-relative OUGHT.36 
 
While the topic of normative uncertainty does not figure in Jackson’s discussion, he nonetheless 
anticipates the dividers’ strategy by positing what he considers “an annoying profusion of 
‘oughts’”: 
I think that we have no alternative but to recognize a whole range of oughts—what [Jill] 
ought to do by the light of her beliefs at the time of action, what she ought to do by the 
lights of what she later establishes (a retrospective ought, as it is sometimes put), what she 
ought to do by the lights of one or another onlooker who has different information on the 
subject, and, what is more, what she ought to do by God’s lights […]37 
 
The idea is that by God’s lights, Jill ought to give John the perfect cure, but by her own lights, she 
ought to give him the safe cure. And dividers seek to make sense of the normative uncertainty 
debate in a similar way: Objectively, they think, we ought to satisfy the true first-order normative 
 
36 Sepielli, “What to Do When You Don’t Know What to Do,” 48. (Sepielli uses capital letters to denote 
concepts, but he also notes that his idea does not strictly require that there are many distinct OUGHT-
concepts.) 
37 Jackson, “Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection,” 471–472. 
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theory, but when we cannot determine what we objectively ought to do, we can at least try to 
determine what we ought to do in some other sense of “ought.” It is the latter, non-objective kind 
of ought that the normative uncertainty debate is taken to concern. 
Clearly, regress threatens. While it is true that the traditional, “objective” questions of 
normative ethics are sometimes hard, the current controversies in the normative uncertainty 
debate suggest that those questions are not easier.38 If we cannot figure out what we ought to do 
in the sense of “ought” that is central to that debate, are we then supposed to try to figure out 
what we ought to do in yet a new sense of “ought”? But why should we expect that to be easier? 
Does this ever stop?39 
However, while the regress problem is important, in what follows I will focus on another 
problem which (for reasons that will emerge) I take to be more fundamental. The problem 
concerns the apparent stalemate that arises between all the oughts that dividers posit. Recall that 
theories about normative uncertainty are supposed to provide some sort of guidance to agents 
like the potential parent, who must decide whether to have children. The idea is to posit many 
different oughts to make sense of the question that such agents may naturally ask. In the relevant 
cases, however, these oughts will often prescribe different action—otherwise figuring out what 
we non-objectively ought to do would be just as hard as figuring out what we objectively ought 
to do (since those questions would simply have the same answer). And the existence of such 
conflicts seems only to give rise to the central deliberative question once again, for we may now 
also be uncertain about which of all these oughts to satisfy. What should we do when they 
 
38 See also Feldman, “Actual Utility, The Objection from Impracticality, and the Move to Expected Utility,”  
for a convincing argument that maximizing expected value is normally not significantly easier than 
maximizing objective value. 
39 For further discussion of the regress problem, see Sepielli, “What to Do When You Don’t Know What to 
Do When You Don’t Know What to Do…”, who seeks to solve it by distinguishing between “perspectival” 
and “systematic” notions of rationality and between different “orders” of rationality. The discussion in 
section 6 will indicate why I find this solution unconvincing. 
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diverge? Is there any genuine sense in which one of them can be said to be privileged, or more 
important than the others?  
6. The Tie-Breaking Problem 
Michael Zimmerman presents the relevant worry when commenting on a variation of the case of 
Jill and John: 
[Jill] seeks your advice, telling you that she believes that drug B would be best for John but 
that she isn’t sure of this. “So,” she says, “what ought I to do?” You are very well informed. 
You know that A would be best for John, that Jill believes that B would be best for him, and 
that the evidence available to Jill (evidence of which she is apparently not fully availing 
herself, since her belief does not comport with it) indicates that C would be best for him. 
You therefore reply, “Well, Jill, objectively you ought to give John drug A, subjectively you 
ought to give him B, and prospectively you ought to give him C.” This is of no help to Jill. 
It is not the sort of answer she’s looking for. She replies, “You’re prevaricating. Which of 
the ‘oughts’ that you’ve mentioned is the one that really counts? Which ‘ought’ ought I to 
act on? I want to know which drug I am morally obligated to give John, period. Is it A, B, or 
C? It can only be one of them. It can’t be all three.”40 
 
Of course, Jill’s questions here are imprecise. If there are many different oughts, she cannot make 
progress by asking which ought she really ought to act on. For it is really the case that she 
objectively ought to act on the objective ought. The problem is that it is equally the case that she 
subjectively ought to act on the subjective ought. Imprecision aside, however, there is surely some 
 
40 Zimmerman, Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance, 7. 
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important, non-trivial form of uncertainty that Jill is trying to express here. It is very similar to 
what the prospective parent tried to ask about the choice of whether to have children. Jill must 
decide which drug to give to John, but what she is told in the dialogue above does not take her 
closer to action. (Compare: Being told that we ought to do what is objectively best or objectively 
right similarly fails to take us closer to action when we do not know what is objectively best or 
objectively right.) In relation to the aim of providing guidance to uncertain agents, this result is a 
disaster. 
Jackson anticipates this problem too. In an attempt to avoid it, he stipulates that by 
“ought,” he means “the ought most immediately relevant to action, the ought which I urged it to 
be the primary business of an ethical theory to deliver.”41 However, whether this stipulation 
solves the problem depends entirely on what the word “relevant” is supposed to mean. Since 
Jackson does not say, let us consider some possibilities. 
Jackson probably did not intend his ought to be relevant in some merely descriptive sense 
of “relevant.” The reason is that descriptive facts do nothing to address Jill’s uncertainty in the 
dialogue above. For example, perhaps one of the oughts is the one that we in fact tend to focus on 
in deliberation. In Jill’s situation, however, this is surely beside the point—for whatever it is that 
her uncertainty concerns, it is not which ought we do tend to satisfy. Rather, as her questions 
suggest, it is something closer to the question of what ought she ought to satisfy. 
For this reason, it is natural to think that Jackson rather intended his ought to be relevant 
in some normative sense of “relevant.” While Jackson does not elaborate on this point, he would 
perhaps agree with Mark Schroeder that there is an “important deliberative sense of ‘ought’, which 
is the central subject of moral inquiry about what we ought to do and why.”42 Schroeder mentions 
 
41 Jackson, “Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection,” 472. 
42 Schroeder, “Ought, Agents, and Actions,” 2. Similarly, Lord writes: “[an agent] doesn’t seem to learn 
what she ought to do, full stop, by learning what she subjectively and objectively ought to do. There is 
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several features that, in his view, distinguish this ought from others. The currently most 
important feature is that the deliberative ought, according to Schroeder, is “the right kind of thing 
to close deliberation.”43 This seems congenial to what Jackson has in mind.  
Importantly, however, to insist that the deliberative ought is the right kind of thing to 
close deliberation serves in this context only to relocate the problem.44 For, if there are very many 
senses of “ought,” why should there not also be very many senses of “right”? In particular, even 
if it is subjectively right to close deliberation using the subjective ought, it presumably objectively 
right to close deliberation using the objective ought. Similarly, and more directly in Jackson’s 
terms, even if his ought is subjectively normatively relevant, it seems undeniable that the question 
of what Jill objectively ought to do is objectively normatively relevant—normatively relevant, 
that is, by God’s lights.  
The upshot is that the stalemate that arose among the different kinds of oughts, and which 
the appeal to normative relevance was supposed to get rid of, now arises among the different 
kinds of normative relevance instead. This is an instance of what I will call “the tie-breaking 
problem.” The problem is that if we believe that the deliberative uncertainty that I have 
highlighted concerns a normative question, it is problematic to think that the normative realm is 
divided into distinct “domains” or “spheres.” For to answer the question that this form of 
uncertainty concerns, we must somehow single out one action as the one to be performed. And 
since distinct oughts normally prescribe different actions, we face the question of which of these 
oughts to satisfy. For somebody who is uncertain about this question, it is useless to learn 
 
another question that hasn’t been answered yet: what ought [she] to do? When we theorize about what 
answers this question, we theorize about the deliberative ought.” (Lord, “What You’re Rationally Required 
to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!)”, 1138). 
43 Schroeder, “Ought, Agents, and Actions,” 9. 
44 Of course, Schroeder’s characterization of the deliberative ought may still be apt for his own purposes, 
which is to distinguish the deliberative ought from the “evaluative” ought that is involved when we claim, 
e.g., that there ought to be world peace. 
 22 
trivialities such as that she objectively ought to satisfy the objective ought, or that she subjectively 
ought to satisfy the subjective ought. 
We might attempt to avoid this stalemate by appealing to some tie-breaking notion that 
distinguishes one ought from all the others. Zimmerman’s Jill tries to do that by asking which 
ought she ought to satisfy. Jackson instead suggests that one of the oughts is “most relevant to 
action.” But all such proposals face a dilemma. On the one hand, if the notion that plays the tie-
breaking role is descriptive, then it is beside the point. It is simply plain that Jill’s uncertainty 
does not merely concern whether the objective ought or the subjective ought has a certain 
descriptive feature. On the other hand, if the tie-breaking notion is normative, then we should 
expect it to be just as divided as the other normative notions. Thus, rather than breaking the tie, 
this move only reinstates the stalemate that we faced among the diverging oughts.45 
This also puts us in a position to see why the tie-breaking problem is more fundamental 
than the regress problem (cf. sect. 4). Recall that a regress of oughts threatens when we are 
uncertain about what we ought to do in the sense of “ought” that is supposed to be central to the 
normative uncertainty debate. It is normally assumed that it would be problematic to simply bite 
the bullet and accept that such a regress does indeed arise. But why? Regresses are not intrinsically 
problematic; for example, we can all agree that if it is true that p, then it is also true that it is true 
 
45 Graham, “In Defense of Objectivism about Moral Obligation,” argues that moral obligations are objective 
(in the sense, roughly, that they are independent of our evidence) on the ground that it is the objective 
moral sense of “ought” that concerns a morally conscientious person. However, Graham also holds that in 
Jackson’s case of Jill and John, Jill is morally conscientious only if she does something (i.e., giving John 
drug A) that she knows that she ought objectively not to do. This makes it hard to avoid the conclusion 
that there is in fact another kind of ought that tracks what a morally conscientious person does (where this 
may depart from the ought she is concerned with), which is (in some sense) the one that we really ought to 
satisfy. At any rate, since Graham assumes that “[a] morally conscientious person is solely concerned with 
her moral obligations” (“In Defense of Objectivism about Moral Obligation,” 98), his suggestion sheds no 
light on cases in which moral requirements conflict with other kinds of normative requirements, which I 
discuss in section 7. For further critical discussion of Graham’s view, see Mason, “Objectivism and 
Prospectivism About Rightness,” sect. 4.c. 
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that p, and true that it is true that is true that p, and so on. So why would it be so bad to accept a 
regress in this particular case? 
I suspect that the regress of oughts seems problematic only given the further assumption 
that of all the oughts that dividers posit, one of them is supposed to be the ought that addresses 
the central deliberative question in cases of normative uncertainty. And it is this assumption that 
the tie-breaking problem calls into question. If that assumption is accepted, then the regress of 
oughts is a problem because it suggests that we might be ignorant of what we ought to do at each 
point of the regress. We could try to figure out what we ought to do, fail to do so, move on to 
figure out what we ought to do in some other sense of “ought,” fail again, and so on. Far from 
being guiding, this process would never result in action. But the tie-breaking problem calls the 
crucial assumption into question at an earlier stage, before worries about regress even arise.  
In other words, while the regress problem is an important epistemological worry for 
dividers, the tie-breaking problem is a conceptual worry which is prior to it. That problem is to 
make sense of the question of which ought we really ought to act on, as Zimmerman’s Jill puts it, 
rather than the epistemic problem of whether we can know what we ought to do, for some given 
sense of “ought.” 
7. The Normative Question 
So far, I have discussed a number of problems concerning whether normative theories can guide 
us in choice situations that involve different forms of uncertainty. However, a possible reaction 
to the discussion so far is to hold that if a normative theory fails to address the deliberative 
uncertainty of an agent who lacks relevant information, it is (so to speak) the agent and not the 
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theory that is to blame.46 The idea is that we can acknowledge that normative theories cannot 
address the central deliberative question for every agent, no matter their epistemic situation, but 
insist that they should at least address that question for agents who know all the relevant truths. 
A problem for this proposal, however, is that considerations that relate to different states 
of information are not the only possible reason to posit many oughts. Another possible reason is 
that different “sources” of normativity, such as morality, prudence, and so on, may generate 
distinct normative requirements.47 If that is so, the tie-breaking problem arises again when those 
requirements cannot be jointly satisfied. To illustrate, suppose that prudence requires you to 
maximize your own well-being while morality requires you to sacrifice yourself for the sake of 
others. When you ask for advice, you are told only that prudentially, you ought to be selfish, but 
morally, you ought to be altruistic. As I suggested above (sect. 1), questions like those from 
Zimmerman’s Jill are natural here too: “Which of the “oughts” that you’ve mentioned is the one 
that really counts? Which “ought” ought I to act on?”48 There is a further salient question about 
which both you and Jill are uncertain. But once again, it is difficult to argue that your uncertainty 
 
46 For this suggestion, see, e.g., Bykvist, “Violations of Normative Invariance: Some Thoughts on Shifty 
Oughts,” 113. In this vein, both Krister Bykvist and Erik Carlson hold that moral theories must be 
practically useful for “ideal” agents only (see Bykvist, “Violations of Normative Invariance: Some Thoughts 
on Shifty Oughts,” and Carlson, “Deliberation, Foreknowledge, and Morality as a Guide to Action”). 
However, I think we should generally be suspicious about appealing to idealized agents in normative 
theorizing; see further Risberg, “Weighting Surprise Parties: Some Problems for Schroeder” and “The 
Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral Philosophy.” 
47 There are many possible views about the structure of normative conflicts, however, and not everyone 
agrees that there are genuinely distinct sources of normativity (for discussion, see Reisner, “Normative 
Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity”). Philosophers who do not think so often hold that there is 
ultimately only one kind of normative question, such as what we all things considered ought to do (for 
suggestions along these lines, see, e.g., Crisp, Reasons and the Good; and Tännsjö, From Reasons to Norms: On 
the Basic Question in Ethics). I will return to this suggestion shortly. 
48 Interestingly, Zimmerman elsewhere suggests that there is no comprehensible question concerning what 
one “really” ought to do when the moral ought conflicts with a non-moral ought (see Zimmerman, The 
Concept of Moral Obligation, 1–2). He thus seems to take conflicting oughts that are due to different sources 
of normativity to be less problematic than conflicting oughts that are relative to different states of 
information. In light of the obvious similarities between the two problems, however, this strikes me as an 
unattractive view. 
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literally concerns whether you ought to act morally or prudentially. For, again, it is really the case 
that morally, you ought to act morally. The problem is that it is equally the case that prudentially, 
you ought to act prudentially. 
The challenge of understanding the salient further question arises particularly clearly in 
the debate about the so-called “normative question,” which is associated with Christine 
Korsgaard. She formulates this question as follows: 
When we seek a philosophical foundation for morality […] we are asking what justifies the 
claims that morality makes on us. This is what I am calling ‘the normative question’. 49 
 
Korsgaard continues to write that an answer to this question 
must actually succeed in addressing someone in [the “first-person” position from which the 
normative question is asked]. It must not merely specify what we might say, in the third 
person, about an agent who challenges or ignores the existence of moral claims. Every moral 
theory defines its concepts in a way that allows us to say something negative about people 
who do that—say, that they are amoral or bad. But an agent who doubts whether he must 
really do what morality says also doubts whether it’s so bad to be morally bad, so the bare 
possibility of this sort of criticism settles nothing.50 
 
While Korsgaard’s reasoning here is supposed to present a problem for moral realism, and for 
normative realism more generally, there has been a lot of confusion about what the problem is 
 
49 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 9–10. 
50 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 16. 
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supposed to be.51 For what question, more exactly, is it that the relevant sort of criticism fails to 
settle? Surely it is not literally whether moral claims are morally justified or whether it is morally 
bad to be morally bad. In this vein, Derek Parfit writes: 
According to what Korsgaard calls normative realism, when we know the relevant facts, 
we are rational if we want, and do, what we have decisive reasons to want, and do. So 
Korsgaard seems here to suggest that, if realism were true, we might need a reason to want, 
and do, what we knew that we had decisive reasons to want, and do. That is clearly false. 
If you should do something, it is not an open question whether you should do it.52 
 
While Parfit’s claims are undeniable as far as they go, it would be surprising if they were to settle 
the doubts of the agent that Korsgaard has in mind. For although the question of whether it is so 
bad to be morally bad is imprecise, there does seem to be an important question which that agent 
is trying to express. Insofar as that question concerns a non-trivial issue, as it seems to do, it 
cannot be answered by the trivial facts that Parfit notes. 
According to a popular view, Korsgaard’s question about morality is best understood in 
terms of a normative concept that is not “indexed” to any particular source of normativity. This 
concept has variously been suggested to concern either reasons, rationality, correctness, the 
“favoring-relation,” or a special kind of ought (which among other things has been called the “all 
things considered ought,” the “ought full stop,” the “ought period,” and the “ought simpliciter”). 
 
51 Dreier, “Can Reasons Fundamentalism Answer the Normative Question?”, helpfully identifies some 
misunderstandings in the debate. However, for reasons that I will present in sections 8–9, I do not share 
Dreier’s view that the problem is that realists cannot explain why it is irrational to act contrary to one’s 
normative judgments. 
52 Parfit, On What Matters: Volume Two, 418. Note that Parfit assumes the controversial view that it is always 
rational for us to do and want what we have most reason to do and want. In particular, if there are “state-
given” reasons for attitudes, we might sometimes have most reason to be irrational; for further discussion, 
see Reisner, “Is There Reason to Be Theoretically Rational?”. 
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For present purposes it does not matter which of those concepts we invoke, so I will focus on the 
concept ALL THINGS CONSIDERED OUGHT (though I will sometimes omit the “all things 
considered”-qualifier in what follows). The idea is that when an agent faces conflicting normative 
requirements, like moral and prudential ones, she may acknowledge both that she morally ought 
to perform a certain action and that she prudentially ought to perform some other action. The 
salient further question is then what she all things considered ought to do. The all things 
considered ought is supposed to be the tie-breaker that resolves her uncertainty. 
While it has sometimes been doubted whether the concept ALL THINGS CONSIDERED 
OUGHT is comprehensible, I will here set this worry aside.53 Instead, in the next section, I will 
argue that even if there is such a special ought, the deliberative question that I have highlighted 
does not concern it. The reason is that even facts about what we all things considered ought to do 
can in principle be subjected to a certain form of practical questioning. That such questioning is 
comprehensible even when all normative questions are settled shows, I believe, that the central 
deliberative question is not a special normative question. 
8. Outrageous Normative Truths 
Many seemingly trivial questions have figured in the discussion so far: Whether it is morally bad 
to be morally bad, for example, and which ought we ought to satisfy. Another trivial question is 
whether the normative truth will turn out to be normatively outrageous. Of course it will not! 
However, a non-trivial question in the same neighborhood is whether the normative truth will 
 
53 For such doubts, see, e.g., Copp, “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason,” Tiffany, 
“Deflationary Normative Pluralism,” and Baker, “Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.” Perhaps 
Sidgwick’s “dualism of practical reason” should also be understood as a version of skepticism about the 
all things considered ought (see Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics). However, another understanding of 
Sidgwick’s view is that while the concept ALL THINGS CONSIDERED OUGHT is itself comprehensible, it is 
simply not satisfied by any action when morality and prudence conflict. 
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turn out to outrage us, in the purely descriptive sense of striking us as outrageous. That this is at 
least conceptually possible follows from the commonly accepted view that the thinnest normative 
concepts, like ALL THINGS CONSIDERED OUGHT, do not have enough descriptive content to 
adjudicate between various competing views about first-order normative questions.54 This view 
is supported by versions of G. E. Moore’s open question argument, Hume’s law, the “is/ought-
gap” and several related ideas. For example, even if consequentialism is true—and even true by 
metaphysical necessity—it is at least conceptually possible that a staunch absolutist theory is true, 
on which the consequences of our actions are irrelevant to their normative status. On such a 
theory, what is normatively important is not whether an action has a good outcome. All that 
matters is that it does not violate a certain set of rules. On this view, it is always forbidden to lie, 
for instance, no matter the consequences of telling the truth. Indeed, this view is often attributed 
to Kant. 
While the staunch theory about lying is probably false, it is nonetheless possible for us to 
reason under the hypothesis that it is true. For instance, it is clear that given the truth of the 
staunch theory, the consequences of our actions are normatively irrelevant, and thus, most of us 
are seriously mistaken about ethics. We can confidently accept such conditionals while rejecting 
their antecedents. Similarly, it is clearly not the case that given that the staunch theory is true, the 
staunch theory is false, so what our intuitions are tracking here is not just the trivial fact that a 
material implication is true if its antecedent is false. Rather, even when we know that p is false, 
 
54 What I mean by this, roughly, is that competence with such concepts is not sufficient for knowing which 
first-order normative theory is true. Note also that what I say here is compatible with the idea of “moral 
fixed points” that Cuneo and Shafer-Landau, “The Moral Fixed Points: New Directions for Moral 
Nonnaturalism” endorse. The reason is that this idea pertains specifically to moral concepts, rather than to 
normative concepts in the more inclusive sense, and one of the consequences of this idea is precisely that 
moral concepts are much “thicker” than what is ordinarily supposed (cf. Cuneo and Shafer-Landau “The 
Moral Fixed Points: New Directions for Moral Nonnaturalism”, 406). Indeed, as Cuneo and Shafer-Landau 
note, the idea of moral fixed points is not supposed to help with the question that arises when morality 
conflicts with some other source of normativity, such as prudence, or perhaps “shmorality” (“The Moral 
Fixed Points: New Directions for Moral Nonnaturalism”, 406–407).  
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we may non-trivially evaluate claims of the form “given p, then q.” (Or, in the jargon: even when 
we know that p is false, we can still “conditionalize” on p.) We may also be uncertain about 
whether to accept such claims, in the sense that we may be uncertain about whether to accept the 
consequent given the truth of the antecedent. I will now argue that in a similar way, we may 
remain uncertain about the deliberative question even given that all the normative questions are 
settled. 
The argument relies on the following thought experiment. You face a choice situation 
where you can prevent great suffering by telling a lie. By telling the truth, on the other hand, you 
will cause even more suffering. Suppose now that it is true that, consequences notwithstanding, 
you are forbidden to tell the lie. In other words, morally, all things considered, and so on, you 
ought to tell the truth. Contrary to what you used to think, it has turned out to be normatively 
irrelevant that you could prevent great suffering by acting otherwise. (To be clear, what I want 
to imagine is not merely that someone tells you that you ought to tell the truth, or that receive 
some other type of evidence for that claim; I want to imagine that it is the case that you ought to 
tell the truth. Again, this assumption is surely coherent, even if it false of metaphysical necessity.) 
In this case, at least three reactions are possible. The first is to “go with” the normative 
truth even though it is outrageous. “If that is what I ought to do,” you could say, “then it is also 
what I shall do,” hence proceeding to tell the truth. The second possibility is simply to give up on 
the commitment to doing what you ought to do. “If that is what I ought to do,” you might say, 
“then I shall instead do what I ought not to do,” thus going on to lie. The point is not that you 
may conclude that the ethical truth has turned out to be unethical (or that the normative truth 
has turned out to be “unnormative”)—that remains an incoherent view. The point is rather that 
you may turn your back on the ethical truth, so to speak, because the trivial fact that the ethical 
truth is ethical might strike you as no more impressive than the fact that immoral actions are 
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legally required in countries whose laws are also immoral. Finally, the third possibility is to 
remain deliberatively uncertain. If you learn that you ought to cause great suffering, you might 
try to question ethics itself—“I ought to do something that strikes me as outrageous; now what 
ought I to do?” But it is now clear that this question does not literally express what your 
uncertainty concerns. You know what you ought to do—morally, all things considered, and so on. 
This is stipulated. Even so, you might remain uncertain about the deliberative question. 
It does not matter what reaction we are in fact disposed to have. What matters is just the 
first reaction is not the only comprehensible one. The possibility of the other reactions shows that 
the deliberative question is not settled even by the assumption that all the truths, including all 
the normative truths, are known. On the view that I will go on to suggest in the next section, this 
is also the type of uncertainty that is made salient, in different ways, by the ethical and 
metaethical debates I have considered above. However, an underlying assumption in those 
debates is that this type of uncertainty must concern a special, puzzling normative question that 
it is difficult to express: What we all things considered ought to do, for instance, or what we ought 
to do in a sense of “ought” that is relevant when we do not know what we objectively ought to 
do. In view of the argument just presented, I believe that we should reject this assumption. 
The argument just presented can be helpfully contrasted with two related ones from the 
literature. First, Clarke-Doane supports his non-cognitivist view of the “further question” by 
appeal to an argument that involves conditionalizing on what he calls “evaluative pluralism,” 
which is roughly the view that there are alternative normative concepts in the sense characterized 
earlier (cf. sect. 2).55 In short, the idea is that under the assumption that we ought to perform some 
action, A, but also ought* not to perform A, it seems that we can remain deliberatively uncertain 
about whether to perform A. While I am sympathetic to Clarke-Doane’s argument, an important 
 
55 Clarke-Doane, Morality and Mathematics, 167–168. 
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difference is that mine does not involve conditionalizing on pluralism but on the first-order 
normative claim that we always ought not to lie. This is an advantage since not everyone finds 
the relevant form of pluralism even intelligible; for instance, William Fitzpatrick writes that 
“there are no intelligible alternative notions of ‘value*’ or ‘shmalue’, or ‘good*’ or ‘appropriate*’ 
[…] We shouldn’t rush to think we have the foggiest idea what such things would even mean.”56 
If Fitzpatrick is right, it is not clear that we can even coherently conditionalize on pluralism. By 
contrast, as I have emphasized, the view that we should never lie is perfectly comprehensible 
(albeit implausible).57 
Another interesting argument has been offered by Matthew Bedke in a critique of 
metaethical non-naturalists—roughly, those who think that normative facts are mind-
independent and different in kind from those that are studied by the sciences.58 Simplifying 
somewhat, Bedke’s central claim is that non-naturalists are committed to revising their moral 
beliefs in immoral ways. He asks us to imagine being told by a reliable oracle that there is no non-
natural property that human pain and non-human pain have in common. If we are non-
naturalists and trust the oracle, we are forced to conclude that human pain and non-human pain 
are not both intrinsically bad (at least insofar as we do not abandon our non-naturalism), since 
non-naturalism implies that intrinsic badness is a non-natural property. And according to Bedke, 
being disposed to revise one’s moral views on the basis of such “non-natural information” is 
 
56 Fitzpatrick, “Commentary on Matti Eklund, Choosing Normative Concepts,” 6. 
57 Clarke-Doane claims that it is “hard to see” how pluralism, understood as a metaphysical thesis about 
normative properties, “could be false” (Morality and Mathematics, 166), and even that it is “almost trivial” 
(Morality and Mathematics, 163, 175). For criticism of these claims, see Eklund, “The Normative Pluriverse,” 
sect. 3. In particular, as Eklund emphasizes, it is highly non-trivial that the plurality of normative properties 
are all instantiable—especially given a non-naturalist view of their nature. In more recent work, Clarke-
Doane writes that “since properties’ identity conditions entail instantiation conditions, there is no doubt 
about [non-natural normative] properties being instantiated if they exist” (“From Non-Usability to Non-
Factualism,” fn. 12). However, this is also too quick, since it is still a non-trivial question whether the 
relevant instantiation conditions are satisfiable. 
58 Bedke, “A dilemma for non-naturalists: irrationality or immorality?” 
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morally objectionable. The merits of Bedke’s argument need not concern us here, but three 
differences between his argument and mine are worth noting.59 First, Bedke focuses on a case in 
which the information we receive is formulated in non-normative terms. He does not discuss a 
case in which we learn that human pain and non-human pain have no normative property in 
common, which would be closer to the case discussed here. With respect to such a case, the 
argument I presented above can plausibly be run again, since in such a case we may well be 
deliberatively uncertain about, e.g., whether to care more about human pain than about non-
human pain—but that is not Bedke’s point. Second, while Bedke’s argument involves imagining 
that we receive evidence that a certain (non-natural) claim is true, my argument does not have that 
epistemic aspect—as emphasized above, it focuses on imagining that a certain (normative) claim 
is in fact true.  
Third and finally, whereas Bedke’s argument targets non-naturalists specifically, my 
argument succeeds also given other views about the nature of normative truths. For example, 
consider the version of constructivism on which normative beliefs are not “fully 
representational,” in the sense that they seek to represent robust, mind-independent facts, but are 
instead true just in case (and because) they accord with the rules or procedures that are 
“constitutive of agency.”60 Surely, the assumption that those rules always require us to tell the 
truth is at least intelligible—indeed, on some interpretations, it is an assumption that Kant in fact 
accepted. Thus, we can imagine facing a choice situation where we can prevent great suffering 
 
59 For critical discussion of Bedke’s argument, see instead Enoch, “Thanks, We’re Good: Why Moral Realism 
is not Morally Objectionable.” 
60 This is one way to understand the constructivist view of Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity. As Gibbard 
notes, Korsgaard can also be read as a non-cognitivist (see Gibbard, “Morality as Consistency in Living: 
Korsgaard’s Kantian Lectures”). On that interpretation, my argument does not clearly work against her 
view (and is not meant to do so), since it is not clear what it means to conditionalize on a normative claim 
if such claims express non-cognitive attitudes. However, I take it that most constructivists want to distance 
themselves from non-cognitivism; see, e.g., Skorupski, The Domain of Reason, 4. 
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by telling a lie, but in which the rules that are constitutive of agency require us to tell the truth. 
In such a case, we might still be uncertain about the central deliberative question (or, indeed, even 
disposed to answer it in a way that the rules of agency forbid). This is so independently of 
whether normative truths are construed as non-natural or otherwise mind-independent.61 
9. A Non-Cognitivist View of Deliberative Uncertainty 
If not even the all things considered ought is what “settles” the central deliberative question, then 
what does this question concern? In this section I will present the account that I favor. 
Consider the version of metaethical non-cognitivism according to which normative 
judgments are intentions, plans, decisions, or some similar kind of mental state.62 According to 
such a view (most straightforwardly understood at least), to judge that an action ought to be 
performed is not to have a belief about it—instead, to make such a judgment is, roughly, to intend 
or decide to perform the action in question if the opportunity should arise.63 Hence, on this view, 
uncertainty about what one ought to do does not amount to uncertainty about the truth of any 
proposition. The reason is simply that unlike beliefs, the relevant mental states—decisions, 
intentions, and the like—cannot be true or false.64 Instead, uncertainty about what one ought to 
 
61 Further, as Enoch, “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What Is Constitutive of 
Action” has emphasized, the status of the rules that are constitutive of agency can also be challenged 
directly, since we can wonder whether to be an agent rather than a “shmagent” (where a shmagent is an 
agent-like creature that is governed by different constitutive rules). For a discussion of the shmagency 
worry in the context of evaluative pluralism, see Clarke-Doane, Morality and Mathematics, 168. 
62 Like many others, I assume that it is true of at least some kind of non-cognitive attitude that if I have that 
attitude towards performing a given action right now, then I will perform that action right now if I can. 
(For instance, Paul Grice (“Intention and Uncertainty,” 263–264) endorses this for intention, and Gibbard 
(Thinking How to Live, 152–153) endorses it for planning.) If there are several types of non-cognitive attitudes 
that are related to action in this way, then the differences between them will not matter in what follows. 
63 While this view is associated with Gibbard, Thinking How to Live, note that whereas Gibbard endorses a 
quasi-realist version of this view about normative judgments, I do not favor it either as a version of quasi-
realism or as a view of normative judgments, for reasons that I will get to in a moment. 
64 I am assuming the falsity of extreme forms of cognitivism about intentions, according to which my 
intention to perform a certain action is simply identical to my belief that I will perform that action. Such 
views face well-known problems; see, e.g., Bratman, “Intention and Means-End Reasoning.” 
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do amounts to a kind of non-cognitive uncertainty about what decision to make. It is better 
characterized as a state of practical indecision (i.e., as a state of not having decided which action 
to perform in the relevant situation, or not having formed an intention about it, etc.) than as a 
state of uncertainty about what the world is like. 
The non-cognitivist account of normative uncertainty just sketched has serious 
problems.65 Hence, throughout the paper, I have assumed that it is false. Instead, I have taken for 
granted the cognitivist views that normative judgments are beliefs that can be true or false, that 
normative uncertainty amounts to uncertainty about the truth of normative propositions, and so 
on. However, even assuming the truth of those views, what I wish to propose is that the non-
cognitivist view just outlined is true of something else: namely, of the deliberative uncertainty, 
or the “central deliberative question,” that we have all along struggled to express literally. On 
this “divided” view of normative and deliberative uncertainty, uncertainty of the latter sort does 
not concern a puzzling normative question that is special in some seemingly inexpressible sense. 
Rather, I suggest, such uncertainty simply concerns what we may call the question of what to do. 
As Jamie Dreier puts it, this type of question is the one that “you answer when and only when 
you have decided what to do. It is answered with an intention, perhaps, or a plan.”66 It is not 
answered by a belief or some similar kind of mental state. Thus, a fortiori, it is not answered by a 
belief whose content is a proposition about what you ought to do, or any other normative 
proposition.67 
 
65 See, e.g., Bykvist and Olson, “Expressivism and Moral Certitude,” and MacAskill, Bykvist, and Ord, 
Moral Uncertainty, chapter 7. Briefly, the problem is that while normative judgments can vary in at least 
two independent dimensions—how good we judge that something is, for example, and how confident we 
are that it is good to that degree—paradigm non-cognitive states, like desires, vary only in one dimension; 
i.e., with respect to their strength. 
66 Dreier, “Can Reasons Fundamentalism Answer the Normative Question?”, 172. 
67 While I find it natural to talk about “questions” and “answers” in this way, it is worth noting that these 
expressions are ambiguous in ways that can cause confusion. In one sense, the question of whether p has 
two answers (at least disregarding indeterminacy and the like); these are its “possible” or “candidate” 
answers. One possible answer to this question is that p, and the other is that not-p. In another sense, 
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Dreier suggests that the relevant type of question can be expressed by the interrogative 
sentence, “What shall I do?” Dreier’s claim may or may not be correct, but this need not concern 
us here.68 What matters is that we can informatively characterize the relevant mental state—it is 
a separate question whether we can perspicuously express it in English or some other natural 
language. What is plausible, however, is that many of the not-easily-understood interrogative 
sentences that I have discussed in this paper are naturally understood as attempts at 
communicating this type of state, even if they do not do so precisely. These include the following: 
 
(i) I don’t know what I ought to do; now what ought I to do? (sect. 4); 
(ii) Which “ought” ought I to act on? (sect. 5);  
(iii) Are the claims that morality make on us really justified? (sect. 6);  
(iv) What I ought to do strikes me as outrageous; now what ought I to do? (sect. 7) 
 
What I propose is that, on a natural interpretation, these questions are all strictly-speaking-
unsuccessful attempts at expressing uncertainty about the question of what to do in the relevant 
situation; i.e., of what to do when one does not know what one ought to do, of what to do when 
different “oughts” are in conflict, of whether to act in accordance with the claims that morality 
make on us, and of what to do if the normative truths turn out to be outrageous, respectively. 
Unlike alternative views, this view explains why this type of uncertainty may remain even given 
 
however, the question of whether p has only one answer—this is its true or correct answer. If p is true, then 
p is the true answer to the question of whether p, whereas if p is false, then the true answer to that question 
is not-p. To answer (verb) the question of whether p, moreover, can also mean different things: in one sense, 
to answer a question is to perform the speech act of asserting a candidate answer to it (in a suitable context), 
whereas if one ponders the question for oneself, then one answers it by accepting one of its candidate 
answers; in this case by forming either a belief that p or a belief that not-p. It is this latter, “first-personal” 
sense of “[to] answer” that I have in mind in the main text. 
68 Perhaps, as suggested to me by Michael Zimmerman (in personal communication), the sentence “What 
am I to do?” better captures the relevant question. 
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that we have knowledge of all the truths, including all the normative ones. Whether we have 
knowledge of those truths ultimately does not matter, because the relevant question never 
directly concerned them in the first place. Instead, because the deliberative question does not 
even concern what is true, it does not have a true answer. 
Another advantage is that this view avoids the tie-breaking problem by steering between 
the horns of the dilemma (cf. sect. 5). The problem, recall, is that when different oughts diverge 
(e.g., the subjective and the objective ought, or the moral and the prudential ought, or even OUGHT 
and OUGHT*), it is hard to make sense of the salient further question in the neighborhood of which 
ought we really ought to act on. On the one hand, descriptive truths seem obviously beside the 
point. On the other hand, appealing to further normative truths seems only to relocate the 
problem. This dilemma is avoided if the salient question is neither about some descriptive truth 
or some normative truth, but is instead non-cognitive and thus not about any truth at all. 
It is also worth noting that unlike most contemporary forms of non-cognitivism about 
normative judgments, the non-cognitivist view I have developed here is not wedded to the 
research program of “quasi-realism.”69 While the quasi-realist’s position has always been difficult 
to state precisely, her aim is to explain most or all realist-seeming notions—i.e., normative truths, 
beliefs, knowledge, reasoning, argumentation, uncertainty, and so on—in non-cognitivist 
friendly terms, and thus avoid the “heavyweight,” supposedly problematic commitments that 
genuine realists incur. Whether this program is successful is at best extremely controversial.70 
And since the form of non-cognitivism I have presented does not concern normative judgments 
 
69 The program was first endorsed by Simon Blackburn (see, e.g., Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism) and 
many others have since followed suit; for example, Toppinen, “Non-Naturalism Gone Quasi: Explaining 
the Necessary Connections Between the Natural and the Normative,” even suggests that quasi-realists 
should endorse non-naturalism about normative truths. 
70 For two influential critical discussions of quasi-realism, see Dreier, “Meta-Ethics and the Problem of 
Creeping Minimalism,” and Schroeder, Being For. 
 37 
proper, it does not require for its truth that the quasi-realist program succeeds. Accordingly, my 
account allows (though it does not entail) that normative truths, beliefs and the like are best 
understood in realist terms, so that, e.g., normative truth requires correspondence with reality, 
normative beliefs are “fully representational,” and so on. 
While the non-cognitivist view of deliberative uncertainty thus diverges from non-
cognitivism about normative judgments, I think that it nonetheless captures an important 
intuition that has often been invoked in support of the latter view. This is the intuition that certain 
practical questions seem not to answer to matters of fact. No matter how much we learn about 
the world, those questions may in principle remain open.71 The divided view vindicates this 
intuition, since it entails that the question of what to do is not a question of fact. In contrast, 
whether quasi-realist versions of metaethical non-cognitivism ultimately vindicate this intuition 
as well is far from clear. For what the quasi-realist assumes is that the relevant practical questions 
are questions about what we ought to do. Thus, when she goes on to try to accommodate the 
possibility of normative truth, knowledge, and so on, she no longer has the resources to explain 
why the relevant practical questions could remain open even given that we have knowledge of 
all the truths, including the normative ones. 
 
10. Two Challenges 
Before concluding, I will consider two possible challenges for my view.72 The first challenge is 
that it might fail to capture the “normativity” of ought-truths and/or ought-judgments (or 
 
71 For example, this intuition arguably underlies Nowell-Smith’s remark that “learning about ‘values’ or 
‘duties’ might well be as exciting as learning about spiral nebulae or waterspouts. But what if I am not 
interested? Why should I do anything about these newly-revealed objects?” (Nowell-Smith, Ethics, 41). It is 
also illustrated by non-cognitivists’ frequent reliance upon Moore’s open question argument (cf. Darwall, 
Gibbard, and Railton, “Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends”) and the assumption that moral 
disagreements could remain even in “ideal” epistemic conditions (see, e.g., Tersman, Moral Disagreement). 
72 Thanks to two anonymous referees for presenting the two challenges considered in this section. 
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“oughts,” for short). This challenge can be spelled out in different ways, depending on how the 
relevant notion of normativity is understood. However, I will argue that each version of the 
challenge can be met. For many things that can be meant by “normative,” my account allows that 
oughts are normative. For some possible senses of “normative,” the account may well rule out 
that oughts are normative, but there is also no strong independent support for thinking that 
oughts are normative in those senses in the first place. Either way, then, the challenge fails. 
To begin with, one possible idea is that a truth or judgment is normative just in case it is 
related to some suitable normative notion, such as ought, good or reason, in the right way. For 
instance, Schroeder suggests that what is “distinctive of the normative” is that it is “all about 
reasons,” and John Broome suggests that the term “normative” means “to do with ought,” where 
the relevant “ought” “is a normative one.”73 This may be called the trivial sense of “normative,” 
since it implies that at least one normative notion—i.e., reasons for Schroeder and ought for 
Broome—counts as normative simply by fiat, by being related to itself in the right way. I myself 
suspect that it is difficult to provide a more informative characterization of normativity than one 
along these lines, but my response does not rest on this assumption. What I want to emphasize is 
just that clearly, nothing in my account excludes that oughts are normative in this sense: oughts 
may well count as normative because they are analyzable in terms of normative reasons, for 
instance, or (as Broome’s view suggests) simply because they are oughts. What matters is just 
that even if oughts are normative in this sense, we may still ask what to do with them, as it were. 
A version of the idea just presented is to take oughts to be normative in the sense of 
standing in some relation to the normative notions of rationality and/or coherence.74 For instance, 
perhaps oughts count as normative because they figure in some true “enkratic” principle, such 
 
73 Schroeder, “Realism and Reduction: The Quest for Robustness,” 13; Broome, Rationality through 
Reasoning, 10. 
74 A version of this challenge was offered to me by Jonathan Way (in personal communication). 
 39 
as: if a subject judges that she ought to do A but does not intend to do A, then she is incoherent 
or irrational. This idea is also compatible with my account—just as we can ask whether to do 
what we ought to do, we can also ask whether to be incoherent, whether to be irrational, and so 
on. 
Another popular idea is that we should distinguish between robust and merely formal 
normativity.75 This distinction departs from the intuitive difference between the oughts of (e.g.) 
morality, epistemology and prudence on the one hand, which are usually taken to be robustly 
normative, and those of (e.g.) etiquette, chess, and grammar on the other hand, which are usually 
taken to be merely formally normative. How this intuitive difference should be cashed out in 
more detail is controversial. One view is that robustly normative requirements differ from merely 
formally normative ones in that they entail the existence of genuine (or genuinely normative) 
oughts, reasons, or the like. This view takes us back to the first suggestion considered above—I 
have already argued that my account allows that some oughts are normative in this sense. 
Another view is that robustly normative oughts differ from merely formally normative ones in 
that they are in some suitable sense not “up to us.” For instance, maybe the oughts of etiquette, 
chess and grammar depend on our attitudes and conventions in a way that the oughts of morality, 
prudence and epistemology do not. (This might, but need not, in turn be because robustly 
normative oughts are “non-natural.”) Nothing in my account rules out that some oughts are 
robustly normative in this sense either, as again, the supposition that some oughts are not up to 
us (and perhaps also non-natural) does not prevent us from asking what to do with them. 
A somewhat different idea is that ought-judgments are normative in the sense that they 
are necessarily connected to motivation. The most straightforward version of this kind of 
“motivational internalism” states that if a subject judges that she ought to perform A, then she is 
 
75 See further, e.g., Finlay, “Defining Normativity,” sect. 3.2. 
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at least defeasibly motivated to perform A. To begin with, I think the arguments in this paper 
provide at least some reason to deny such a strong, unqualified form of internalism. It seems 
plausible, for instance, that an ought-judgment might leave a subject motivationally “cold” if she 
finds it outrageous, or if she cares only about what she ought* to do. That said, the account I have 
presented is consistent with the idea that ought-judgments necessarily provide even a very high 
degree of defeasible motivation to perform the relevant action. The reason is that even if this is 
true, we still face the question of whether to act in accordance with the motivation that the ought-
judgment provides.  
The only version of motivational internalism that might pose problems for my proposal 
is the extremely strong view that ought-judgments always provide overriding or indefeasible 
motivation, so that if a subject judges that she ought to perform A, then she performs A (at least 
if she can). The reason is that this view entails that we always do what we think we ought to do, 
which in turn could make it hard to see how we might answer the practical question of what to 
do and the normative question of what we ought to do in different ways. However, such extreme 
forms of internalism are arguably too extreme; indeed, as Fredrik Björklund, Gunnar Björnsson, 
John Eriksson, Ragnar Francén Olinder and Caj Strandberg note, “[i]n contemporary metaethics, 
it is regularly assumed” that even the view that ought-judgments entail defeasible motivation is 
“too strong,” since counter-examples to it seem “possible to conceive.”76 Thus, I am happy to 
simply assume that this extreme form of motivational internalism, according to which normative 
judgments always provide overriding motivation, is false. 
The final idea that I will consider is that ought-judgments are normative in the sense that 
they constitute answers to questions about what to do. As it stands, this suggestion does not 
 
76 Björklund, Björnsson, Eriksson, Francén Olinder, and Strandberg, “Recent Work on Motivational 
Internalism,” 126. 
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amount to much more than the denial of the view that I have offered. I do not deny that this 
suggestion has often been taken for granted—on the contrary, as I have emphasized, the 
assumption that something like this view is true arguably underlies several important debates in 
ethics, metaethics and metanormativity. But unless some independent support for this suggestion 
is presented, the mere fact that my view contradicts it surely cannot itself be seen as an objection. 
The second challenge that I will consider is that if my account is correct, it is not clear why 
we so often ask ourselves normative questions, especially when we are trying to reach choices. 
Why do we not simply ask ourselves what to do, rather than what we ought to do, if these 
questions really are distinct? While this challenge is not identical from the first one, they might 
still be related, as this challenge can also be understood as an expression of the more general 
worry that oughts are in some sense more practically significant than my account allows. 
The question of why we ask ourselves what we ought to do rather than what to do (when 
we do so) may well be at least partially an empirical question. Accordingly, what I will have to 
say about it is bound to be somewhat speculative. But that said, three considerations are worth 
noting before closing. 
First, a kind of error theory might in some cases be plausible. After all, philosophical 
theorizing often allows us to draw distinctions that we do not usually recognize in everyday life. 
So it might be that we sometimes ask ourselves what we ought to do rather than what to do 
simply because we have not realized that these questions are distinct. If we were to realize this, 
perhaps we would care less about what we ought to do and more about what to do. I am not 
suggesting that this kind of error theory fully explains why we so frequently ask ourselves what 
we ought to do (rather than what to do), but it may at least play a role in such an explanation. 
Second, another partial explanation might be that we are sometimes simply interested in 
what the normative truths are. In particular, even Ross is right that we do not ask ourselves 
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normative questions only to satisfy our curiosity (cf. sect. 3), that does not entail that curiosity is 
never even part of the reason why we do so. Indeed, although I have focused on normative and 
metanormative debates that highlight the question of what to do, many other debates in these 
fields are less closely connected to action. For instance, it is far from clear how questions such as 
whether the betterness-relation is transitive, whether the good is more fundamental than the 
right, and so on, could even have a bearing (except perhaps very indirectly) on the question of 
what to do. With respect to such questions, the reason why we investigate them might be the 
same as when we try to find out whether the causation-relation is transitive or whether the brain 
is more fundamental than the mind: We are simply interested in their answers. 
Third and finally, as externalists about moral motivation have emphasized, it might be a 
metaphysically contingent but still quite modally robust fact about us that we often want to do 
the right thing.77 This suggestion interacts with the second one made above, since it sheds further 
light on why we might often be interested in figuring out answers to normative questions: Doing 
so might not only satisfy our intellectual curiosity but also help us achieve something we want. 
If this idea is correct, it also helps explain why we often do not consider the question of whether 
to do what we ought to do—we might simply be happy with figuring out what we ought to do 
and do our best to act accordingly.  
Though there is more to say about these issues, the three considerations I have presented 
together go at least some way towards explaining why we so often ask ourselves what we ought 
to do, even if that question is distinct from that of what to do. 
 
77 See, e.g., Copp, “Belief, Reason and Motivation: Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem,” 49–51. 
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11. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I have focused on a distinctive deliberative question that many debates in ethics, 
metaethics and metanormativity highlight. I have argued against the common view that this 
question concerns a special normative notion. Instead, I have offered a combination of 
cognitivism about normative questions and non-cognitivism about the question of what to do. 
An upshot of this divided view is that even if there are truths about what we all things considered 
ought to do, the central deliberative question does not have a true answer. 
As I have noted (cf. sect. 9), my view is strictly speaking consistent with the “robust” or 
“ardent” realist position that there are objective, irreducible, heavyweight truths about how we 
ought to act.78 That said, however, I do think that my view threatens to undermine an important 
argument for normative realism. For if the question of what to do does not even concern the 
truths that realists posit, then there is one way in which those truths seem much less interesting 
than we often take them to be. At least in many cases, as Jackson and Ross suggest (sect. 3), we 
do not ask ourselves what we ought to do with the sole aim of learning more about the world. 
We also do so to reach choices in our lives. An attractive feature of ardent realism is that it 
promises to take such questions seriously, by positing objective truths that are supposed to 
constitute their answers.79 However, this argument is undercut if there is an open practical 
question that remains even when we acquire knowledge of those truths: Whether to do what we 
ought to do.80  
 
78 The labels “robust realism” and “ardent realism” are from Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, and Eklund, 
Choosing Normative Concepts, respectively. 
79 For example, this idea seems to underlie David Enoch’s argument for the view that irreducibly normative 
truths are indispensable for deliberation (see Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, ch. 3). 
80 For very valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper, thanks to Karl Bergman, Daniel Fogal, 
Anna Folland, Jens Johansson, Simon Rosenqvist, Debbie Roberts, Amogha Sahu, Jonathan Way, and in 
particular, to Krister Bykvist, Erik Carlson, Justin Clarke-Doane, Matti Eklund, Nils Franzén, Victor 
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